Regional Matching Frictions and Aggregate Unemployment by Sanna-Mari Hynninen et al.
  1
 





University of Jyväskylä 
 
Aki Kangasharju 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
(aki.kangasharju@vatt.fi) 
Arkadiankatu 7, 00101 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Jaakko Pehkonen 






Abstract: This study demonstrates that a stochastic frontier approach applied to 
regional level data offers a convenient and interesting method to examine how 
regional differences in matching efficiency and structural factors contribute to 
aggregate unemployment. The study reveals notable and temporally stable differ-
ences in matching efficiency across travel-to-work areas in Finland. If all areas 
were as efficient as the most efficient one, the number of hirings would increase 
by about 40 per cent. This would reduce the aggregate unemployment rate from 
the current 8.5 per cent level to 6.0 per cent. If all the areas shared the same 
structural characteristics as the most favourable area, the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate would drop to 7.1 per cent. 
Key words: Efficiency, matching, aggregate unemployment, regional labour 
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1. Introduction 
Labour markets are characterised by a large number of job seekers searching for 
vacancies and a number of firms searching for new workers. The process of 
matching job seekers and vacancies involves frictions that are, to a certain extent, 
necessary to guarantee a high quality of matches. The best possible match 
typically requires a time-consuming search on both sides of the labour market. At 
worst, however, frictions delay the matching process reflecting, among other 
things, in high structural unemployment. Indeed, structural unemployment is 
high in Europe. In 2004, the aggregate EU unemployment rate was about 7.5 per 
cent and, according to OECD, a vast majority of this rate could be accounted for 
by structural factors.
1 It is therefore interesting and very important to explore the 
extent to which matching frictions contribute to aggregate unemployment.  
 
Previous research has shown that the characteristics of the matching process 
determine unemployment less than aggregate demand shocks or productivity 
shocks (Shimer, 2005).
2 Nevertheless, the role of frictions may be substantial. 
For example, Yashiv (2004), who simulated the decline in unemployment 
following the implementation of different policy measures designed to affect 
frictions in the labour market, observed that hiring subsidies have substantial 
effects on labour market outcomes, including aggregate unemployment.  
 
The present study augments that of Yashiv (2004) by providing evidence of the 
role of frictions and structural factors as determinants of one labour market 
outcome, namely aggregate unemployment. Rather than simulation methods, this 
study uses actual data and investigates the role of frictions as a determinant of 
matches by distinguishing the effects of structural factors from inefficiencies in 
the matching process. Structural factors are approximated by long-term 
unemployment, the age of the unemployed, the size of active labour market 
programs, and the type of job seekers (unemployed, employed or out-of-labour-
force).  Inefficiencies in the matching process are estimated by a stochastic 
frontier approach.
3 The paper will demonstrate that a stochastic frontier approach 
applied to regional level data offers a useful method to examine how regional 
                                                 
1 OECD (2005). See also a recent study by Holden and Nymoen (2002), who estimate structural unem-
ployment in Nordic countries. 
2 Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990) conclude that in the U.S. labour market short- and medium-term 
fluctuations in unemployment have mainly been due to aggregate activity shocks rather than due to chan-
ges in the degree of reallocation intensity related to the matching of jobs and workers. See also Albaek 
and Hansen (2004) for more recent findings.   
3 See Farrell (1957), Battese and Coelli (1995), Coelli et al. (1998), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for 
estimation methods. 
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The matching function is interpreted as a frontier that determines the upper 
boundary for matches that can possibly be produced by the given stocks of job 
seekers and vacancies. The estimated gross inefficiency (distance to the frontier) 
can be divided into the above-mentioned structural part and net technical 
inefficiency, the latter including the operation of the local employment agency 
and unobserved factors. Unobserved factors include cultural differences across 
investigated areas, such as attitudes towards unemployment and 
entrepreneurship. Using this methodology, Ibourk et al. (2004) observed that 
cross-regional differences in efficiencies are large in France, the net efficiency 
measures varying from 40 to 75 per cent. Fahr and Sunde (2005) also report wide 
efficiency differentials across German areas, where in the majority of regions the 
efficiency measure is between 50 and 80 percent. Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003), 
in turn, found regional differences to be modest in Finland.  
 
In the present study the matching efficiency is estimated with a high quality 
Finnish data set, which allows us to examine the matching process at monthly 
rather than lower (e.g. annual) frequency, thereby decreasing problems of time 
aggregation (Burdett et al., 1994). The data also allow us to divide the pool of job 
seekers into detailed sub-categories. We prefer the analysis of selected travel-to-
work areas (TTWA) rather than administrative regions, as they are better 
descriptors than administrative regions of the job and worker search areas and 
they cover the jurisdiction of the Local Labour Force Office.
5
 
The results of the study suggest that average gross efficiency improved by about 
3 per cent annually and the matching technology progressed by about 1 per cent 
per annum over the investigation period, indicating decreasing matching 
frictions. The improvement in the gross efficiency is accounted for by changes in 
structural factors rather than better net efficiency. Without improvements in 
structural factors during the investigation period the current 8.5 per cent rate of 
unemployment would be about 1.0 percentage points higher. Improved matching 
technology, in turn, decreased the unemployment rate by about 0.7 percentage 
points over the same period. The main finding relating to the role of regional 
differences in the matching process is that there are notable and temporally stable 
differences in efficiency across travel-to work-areas. If all regions were as 
efficient as the most efficient one, the number of hirings would increase by about 
40 per cent. This would decrease the aggregate unemployment rate from the 
                                                 
4 The study does not try to explain underlying causes of efficiency differences between regions. We simp-
ly assess how much efficiency differences and differences in labour input affect aggregate unemplo-
yment. 
5 Monthly data include 19 travel-to-work areas between 1995 and 2003. An earlier Finnish study by Ilma-
kunnas and Pesola (2003) uses annual data and 15 administrative regions over the period 1988-1997. 
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current 8.5 per cent level by 2.5 percentage points. On the other hand, if all the 
areas shared the same job seeker characteristics as the most favourable TTWA, 
the aggregate unemployment rate would drop by 1.4 percentage points.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the stochastic 
frontier approach to the matching function and specifies the models. The 
modelling follows that of Battese and Coelli (1995). Chapter 3 describes the data 
set, which comprises the monthly outflow from unemployment to employment 
registered unemployed job seekers at the end of month, and registered vacant 
jobs at the end of month over nine years. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the results of 
the efficiency analysis. The chapter includes a discussion of the determinants of 
matching efficiency as well as gross and net efficiencies. This is followed by an 
analysis of the quantitative effects of efficiency differences on matches and 
aggregate unemployment. Chapter 6 concludes the paper.  
   4 
2. Model 
We specify our empirical model as a stochastic production frontier, which allows 
us to concentrate on the technical efficiency of the matching process. We 
estimate how far the observed matching outcomes are from the efficiency frontier 
and examine the factors that contribute to these inefficiencies. Our matching 
function takes the well-known Cobb-Douglas form. The output of the production 
process is hirings during a month as function of unemployment and vacancy 
stocks at the beginning of the month, H = h(U, V). It is assumed that the function 
is concave and increasing in both U and V, and h(0, V) = 0 and h(U, 0) = 0. The 
stochastic production frontier model takes the following form, defined by Battese 
and Coelli (1995): 
 
lnHi,t = [α + β1lnUi,t-1 + β2lnVi,t-1]+ ωi,t – υi,t       (1) 
 
The expression in square brackets forms the matching frontier that gives the 
maximum number of outputs, i.e. matches, that can be achieved for the given 
number of production inputs, i.e. job seekers and vacancies. U and V are lagged 
by one period, as these stocks are measured at the end of each month. The error 
terms ωi,t are iid and follow the N(0, σω
2) distribution. The term υi,t is a non-
negative variable, which is assumed to account for technical inefficiency in 
production and to follow the N(Zi,tδ, συ
2) distribution truncated at zero (Coelli 
1997).  
 
This kind of specification assumes that “environmental” factors that might 
increase or decrease the efficiency of production directly influence the degree of 
technical inefficiency, not the shape of the production technology (Coelli et al. 
1999). The Zi,t vector, which can change both in time and space, includes these 
inefficiency regressors. The term υi,t can be expressed as υi,t =  Zi,tδ + εi,t, where 
the random variable εi,t is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance συ
2 such that the point of truncation is - Zi,tδ, i.e. 
εi,t ≥ - Zi,tδ. These assumptions are consistent with υi,t being non-negative 
truncations of the N(Zi,tδ, συ
2) distribution (Battese and Coelli 1995). 
 
Time effects can be modelled by including them either in the production function 
or the efficiency term. If time effects are located in the production function, the 
assumption is that they capture changes in technology. If the time effects are in 
the efficiency term, then they capture the average change of the TTWAs with 
respect to the time invariant frontier. The empirical section attempts to model 
time effects in different ways. 
 
The parameters of the stochastic frontier and the efficiency term can be jointly 
estimated by maximising the log-likelihood of the model (Coelli 1997, Coelli et 
   5 
al. 1998). The conditional estimates of the efficiency coefficients TEi,t are 
computed as: 
 
TEi,t = [exp(-υ*i,t) |H, U, V, Z] = E[exp-(Zi,tδ*+ εi,t*)|H, U, V, Z]  (2) 
 
Since the likelihood of the model can be expressed as σ
2 = σω
2 + συ
2, γ = συ
2 /σ
2 
summarises the relative importance of the residual associated with the 
inefficiency term. σ
2 and γ are used as parameters to be estimated instead of σω
2 
and συ
2. The efficiency measure has the property TEi,t, = 1 when actual hirings H 
lie on the matching frontier; otherwise TEi,t < 1. 
 
Technical efficiency of this kind is output-oriented. For given stocks of vacant 
jobs and job seekers, the behaviour of job seekers and firms mainly determines 
the number of successful matches: job seekers and firms choose how intensively 
they search for a successful match, and the co-ordinator between the parties can 
affect these intensities by its own activity. The optimal search intensity that the 
matching parties choose can vary between regions due to the different conditions 
under which the matching process is taking place. As a consequence, the level of 
output can vary between regions in the matching process for given levels of 
inputs. In this context, output-oriented efficiency measures how much higher the 
output could be when the number of inputs cannot be chosen.  
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3. Data 
The data comprise 108 months (from January 1995 to December 2003) and the 
19 largest travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) in Finland, yielding more than 2 000 
observations.
6 Data sources are the Ministry of Labour and Statistics Finland. 
The registers of the Ministry of Labour include all job seekers, vacancies and 
matches recorded at Local Labour Force Offices.
7 The dependent variable 
(matches) is the outflow from unemployment to employment (excluding outflow 
to subsidised jobs) during a month. Registered unemployed job seekers 
(excluding those participating in active labour market programmes) and 
registered vacant jobs are measured at the end of each month.  
 
Following earlier literature we introduce explanatory variables that capture 
certain characteristics of the behaviour of job seekers and firms, thus providing 
evidence on the role of frictions in the matching process. Four groups of 
variables are used in the empirical analysis. First, we use the proportions of 
young unemployed (<25) and old unemployed (>55) from the whole 
unemployment stock to control for the effect of the age structure of the 
unemployment pool on matching efficiency. Second, the share of long-term 
unemployed job seekers (over one year) is a control for the differences in search 
intensities among the job seekers and the firms’ hiring attitudes towards the loss 
of skills among job seekers. In addition, we assume that the proportion of 
employed job seekers and job seekers out of the labour force in the 
unemployment stock controls for the job competition in the labour market.  
 
Third, the flow of unemployed to active labour market programmes (ALMPs) 
relative to the unemployment stock captures the effect of ALMPs on the structure 
of the unemployment pool. Although hirings from ALMPs or job seekers among 
these programmes are not included in the matching function, it is assumed that 
ALMPs have a positive effect on matching efficiency, since persons participating 
in these programmes are those whose employment on the open labour market 
tends to be most difficult (Ibourk et al., 2004; Hämäläinen and Ollikainen, 2005). 
Hence, ALMPs positively affect the composition of the unemployment stock. 
Fourthly, the size of the population captures the effect of the size and the 
dynamics of the labour market as well as the size of social networks (Wahba and 
Zenou 2003). The variable for the size of the population is a yearly value, 
whereas other inefficiency regressors are monthly averages taken for every year.  
 
                                                 
6 The size is measured by the number of unemployed. However, one large TTWA, Rauma, was excluded 
from the analysis. Due to ship building and the nuclear energy industry there was a huge and abrupt inc-
rease in the number of hirings from 1999 to 2000 with the number of unemployed and vacancies re-
maining stable. We think that these changes are not typical of regional labour markets. 
7 There are more than 150 Local Labour Offices in Finland. The market share of the offices is about 60 % 
of all hirings in Finland (Kangasharju et al., 2005). 
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Appendix 1 summarises the descriptive statistics of the data according to the 
region. There are 247 432 unemployed job seekers searching for jobs together 
with 11 106 vacant jobs needing workers during an average month. The 
proportion of hirings from among the unemployed is only 7.5 per cent, the 
highest value being 11.9 and the lowest 4 per cent. A large share of the 
unemployment pool is of the long-term type, being 28.7 per cent on average. 
Thus, almost one third of those registered as unemployed in the public 
employment agency are those whose employment in the open labour market is 
difficult. By age, about one third of the unemployed are over 55 years old and 
about 15 per cent are younger than 25 years. The number of other than 
unemployed job seekers as a proportion of the unemployment pool is over 50 per 
cent, but the fraction of the flow to the ALMP is only 4.3 per cent. The 
unemployment rate varies from 10.8 per cent in the capital region of Helsinki to 
21.4 per cent in Rovaniemi in Lapland. Differences in the size of the population 
are wide: Helsinki is clearly the most important labour market in Finland. 
 
Figure 1 provides preliminary information on regional differences by tabulating 
hiring probabilities (H/U) and labour market tightness (V/U) across regions. 
There are four TTWAs in the data set that differ considerably from the others. In 
Helsinki and Vaasa the hiring probabilities are much lower and the labour market 
tension rates are higher than on average. Seinäjoki and Kajaani, in turn, exhibit 
higher than average hiring rates with an average labour market tension rate. 
Excluding these four TTWAs, the positive relationship between the hiring 
probability and the labour market tightness is clear. However, this simple 
analysis excludes factors that may affect matching efficiency and it does not 
allow for time series information. This will be done in the next sections. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Specification tests 
Table 1 reports the results of the stochastic frontier estimations. The estimated 
coefficients for the two main inputs of the matching function, U and V, are 
robust across specifications and in line with earlier international (Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2001) as well as Finnish (Kangasharju et al. 2005, Ilmakunnas and 
Pesola, 2003) studies.
8 To summarise, the results support the idea of constant 
returns to scale such that the role of vacant jobs in the matching process is 
notably smaller than that of unemployed job seekers, the elasticity of hirings with 
respect to unemployed job seekers varying between 0.74 and 0.79 and with 
respect to vacant jobs between 0.09 and 0.11.  
 
For the sake of comparison, the model was estimated first without inefficiency 
regressors (specification 1). Then the inefficiency regressors were included and 
the model was estimated with three different kinds of linear time trend: a model 
with a time trend both in the matching function and in technical efficiency, a 
model with a trend in technical efficiency only and, finally, a model with a trend 
in the matching function only.
9 Specifications including the time trend only in 
one part of the model result in quantitatively similar effects. The third 
specification implies a one per cent improvement per annum in the position of 
the TTWAs with respect to the time invariant efficiency frontier over the 
research period (12 months times 0.001).
10 Specification 4, in turn, indicates an 
inward shift of the Beveridge curve by one per cent per annum. The specification 
with a time trend in both the function and technical efficiency (specification 2) 
implies a significant positive trend in the matching technology (4 per cent per 
annum) together with a considerable negative trend in matching efficiency (5 per 
cent per annum). As above, the total impact is close to one per cent per annum. 
Now, however, the combined impact on the matching performance is negative. 
 
There is no clear-cut answer or solid test results to discriminate between the trend 
alternatives. In specification 2, however, the parameter estimates for the trend 
variables and their standard errors suggest the non-rejection of the hypothesis 
that their joint impact is zero.  A similar remark also applies to specification 3, 
where the estimate for the trend variable is significant only at the 15 per cent 
level. Thus, only specification 4 contains a statistically significant trend variable. 
The plausibility of this specification, which treats the time trend as a technology 
                                                 
8 The estimations have been carried out using the program Frontier 4.1 (Coelli 1997). 
9 As the analysed time period only covers an economic upturn with a positive trend in hirings and vacan-
cies, we consider that the use of time trend rather than time dummies is adequate and parsimonious. 
10 For inefficiency regressors, a positive coefficient means a negative effect on efficiency and a negative 
coefficient a positive effect on efficiency. 
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parameter in the matching function, can be further supported by evidence of the 
increasing use of information technology in public employment agencies over the 
investigation period.
11 Hence, the subsequent discussion and calculations will be 
based on specification 4.
12
 
Finally, the γ coefficient, which corresponds to the estimated share of the 
inefficiency term in the variance of the composed error term, is 0.55 and 
statistically significant. The rest of the variation, 0.45, is due to random errors. In 
addition, the LR test of one-sided error rejects the hypothesis that the inefficiency 
part of the error is equal to zero. The frontier is, however, clearly stochastic, not 
deterministic, since the random error also has a significant role in the variation of 
the composed error term. 
4.2 Hirings elasticities 
According to the literature, the search intensity of job seekers and the ranking 
behaviour of firms are crucial determinants of matching frictions (e.g. Pissarides, 
1992; Anderson and Burgess, 2000; Burgess and Turon, 2003). Our results 
suggest that this also holds in Finland. The matching efficiency goes down by 
about 8 per cent with a one percentage point increase in the group of long-term 
unemployed, the group with lowest search effort and with a stigma effect among 
employers (Table 1). This is further supported by the result that an increase in the 
flow to the ALMP has a positive effect on matching efficiency, indicating that a 
decrease in the relative proportion of those who are extremely difficult to employ 
in the unemployment pool decreases matching frictions. The contribution of a 
percentage point increase in the ALMP variable to technical efficiency is about 
10 per cent. 
 
A relative increase in employed and out-of-the-labour-force job seekers 
decreases the matching efficiency. The impact of this variable is, however, only 
about one-tenth of the impact of the long-term unemployment variable. The 
ranking of job seekers according to their labour market position and differences 
in the search intensity seems to cause additional frictions in the matching of 
unemployed job seekers and vacancies when there are also other job seekers 
competing for jobs in the market. Hence, notable employability differences occur 
between unemployed and other job seekers, as well as between the unemployed 
with long and short unemployment spells. 
                                                 
11 See Räsänen (2005), who discusses structural changes in public employment agencies. The changes are 
related to the expanded use of information technology, including the increased use of vacancy announce-
ments and job searching methods via the Internet. 
12 It is worth noting that otherwise the results of specifications 3 and 4 are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar. Furthermore, these results differ significantly from those of specification 2 only in one respect, 
the impact of the ALMP variable on the matching efficiency being about 50 per cent lower in the latter 
case. 
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The age structure of the job seeker stock also matters: older and younger job 
seekers contribute positively to matching efficiency relative to the middle-aged. 
Both variables obtain a robust estimate of around 2.5. The results suggest that the 
long-term unemployment variable seems to capture the negative effect of those 
older job seekers who are difficult to employ, and therefore older age itself has a 
positive effect on efficiency. The finding may reflect the better work morale of 
older job seekers as well as the educational requirements of the job offers: vacant 
jobs reported in the public employment agency often require only low education 
and the education level of older job seekers makes them suitable for these jobs. 
The efficiency-enhancing effect of young job seekers, in turn, suggests that they 
are flexible and willing to accept low-paid and part-time jobs: their search effort 
is high and reservation wages low.  
 
A larger population size increases matching efficiency, although the effect is 
rather modest. A ten per cent increase in the size of the population of a TTWA 
leads to an efficiency increase of about 0.6 per cent. Growing regions tend to be 
more dynamic and therefore economic activity in them is livelier and more 
diversified than elsewhere, which also makes the matching process efficient.  
 
Table 1.  Parameter estimates 
 
Dependent variable:
 ln(hirings from unemployment) Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
Constant -0.367 (-2.6) -0.873 (-4.6) -0.804 (-4) -0.828 (-4.1)
ln (Ut-1) 0.736 (36.2) 0.778 (33.7) 0.787 (30.4) 0.782 (31)
ln (Vt-1) 0.089 (6.5) 0.107 (8.9) 0.105 (8.6) 0.104 (8.5)
t 0.004 (11.6) 0.004 (3.5) 0.001 (2.2)
Inefficiency regressors
t 0.005 (3.2) -0.001 (-1)
Constant 0.502 (9.5) -1.122 (-2.4) 0.131 (0.3) 0.02 (0.06)
Young/all unemployed -1.042 (1.3) -2.666 (-3.1) -2.556 (-3.2)
Old/all unemployed -2.653 (-6.7) -2.934 (7.7) -2.767 (-6.9)
Long-term/all unemployed 8.361 (19.1) 7.842 (19.4) 7.956 (19.8)
(Employed+out of the labour force)/unemployed 0.743 (4.9) 0.75 (4.8) 0.829 (5)
(Flow to ALMP)/unemployed -4.175 (-1.6) -9.318 (-3.6) -10.182 (-3.7)
ln (size of population) -0.029 (-1.3) -0.058 (-2.6) -0.06 (2.8)
sigma-squared 0.199 (14.4) 0.112 (20.8) 0.107 (20.1) 0.109 (18.9)
gamma 0.893 (39.6) 0.727 (9.7) 0.538 (5.5) 0.554 (5.7)
log likelihood -878.5 -451.7 -458.4 -456.3
LR test of one-sided error 79.8*** 931.8*** 1079*** 924.2***
Returns to scale 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89
Number of observations 2 052 2 052 2 052 2 052
Note: Specification 4 is the preferred one. The estimation method in all specifications is maximum 
likelihood. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Rejection of the hypothesis on one-sided error at 
the 0.01% level. 
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4.3 Gross vs. net efficiency 
The technical efficiency measures can be divided into two types: gross efficiency 
and net efficiency (see Coelli et al. 1999; Ibourk et al. 2004). The gross efficiency 
is the technical efficiency when all inefficiency regressors take their actual values 
in all regions in all periods. Hence, it measures the technical efficiency when the 
explanatory variables are allowed to affect the matching performance as they in 
reality do. The net efficiency, in turn, measures the technical efficiency when 
effects of the inefficiency regressors are removed from the model. This is done 
by setting the values of the explanatory variables to be equal in all regions. Thus, 
it measures the part of the technical efficiency that is independent of the 
environment of the matching process. It can partly be derived from the 
functioning of the employment agency and partly from unobserved factors 
related, for instance, to cultural factors in a particular region. These may include 
factors such as attitudes towards unemployment and entrepreneurship. 
 
The gross and net efficiency scores of separate TTWAs are reported in Table 2 
(columns 1 and 2).
13 The highest gross (net) scores are about 75-88 (73-79) per 
cent of the maximum. The lowest gross efficiency score is 0.40 and the lowest 
net score 0.36.  The average gross and net scores across the period and TTWAs 
are 0.65 and 0.58. Columns 3 and 4 report the difference between the score of the 
TTWA and the area with the highest net efficiency score (Turku). As a whole, 
our results are similar to those reported for France by Ibourk et al. (2004) and for 
Germany by Fahr and Sunde (2005). Both studies report that cross-regional 
differences in efficiencies are considerable. In France, the net efficiency 
measures vary from 40 to 75 per cent. In Germany, for the majority of regions 
the efficiency measure is between 50 and 80 per cent. Ilmakunnas and Pesola 
(2003), in turn, report less sizeable differences for Finland.
14
 
The difference between gross and net efficiency scores is determined by 
environmental factors. They can affect the performance of the matching process 
either positively or negatively. In our data the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between the gross and the net efficiency scores is 0.94. This implies 
that the differences in net efficiency, not the differences in the matching 
environment, determine the efficiency ranking of the regions. In addition, the 
ranking of the TTWAs according to their net efficiency score is stable over the 
research period. The Spearman rank correlation between the estimates in 1995 
                                                 
13 The net efficiency scores are calculated by replacing the real values of inefficiency regressors by avera-
ge values of the inefficiency regressors over all TTWAs and the whole 108 months. Net efficiency scores 
may still differ from one region to another because the value of the conditional expectation of the random 
term εi,t may differ. 
14 Their estimates vary between 0.69 and 0.93 for the period 1988-95. It should be noted that Ilmakunnas 
and Pesola (2003) use annual data based on a different area classification (15 administrative regions). 
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Table 2.  Gross and net efficiency according to region (average over time) 
 
Mean values
Efficiency, Efficiency, Turku's gross- Turku's net-
gross net own gross own net
Turku 0.777 0.799
Seinäjoki 0.887 0.787 -0.110 0.012
Kajaani 0.833 0.779 -0.056 0.020
Kouvola 0.821 0.754 -0.044 0.045
Oulu 0.756 0.732 0.021 0.067
Tampere 0.698 0.659 0.079 0.140
Joensuu 0.762 0.633 0.015 0.166
Kuopio 0.777 0.611 0.000 0.188
Hämeenlinna 0.626 0.599 0.151 0.200
Kokkola 0.715 0.576 0.062 0.223
Pori 0.641 0.568 0.136 0.231
Jyväskylä 0.544 0.519 0.233 0.280
Lappeenranta 0.612 0.495 0.165 0.304
Helsinki 0.494 0.486 0.283 0.313
Kotka 0.528 0.481 0.249 0.318
Mikkeli 0.480 0.435 0.297 0.364
Rovaniemi 0.527 0.427 0.250 0.372
Vaasa 0.487 0.385 0.290 0.414
Lahti 0.408 0.364 0.369 0.435
All, on average 0.651 0.584 0.133 0.227
Sum, all regions




net efficiency  
4.4 Temporal patterns of efficiency 
Figure 2 describes how the gross and net efficiencies have developed over time at 
the aggregate level. The basic finding is that the gap between the two efficiency 
scores has enlarged continuously over the period. This development is due to the 
continuous improvement in gross efficiency over the investigation period, and 
particularly in 1989 and 2000. The average net efficiency score, in turn, has been 
stable, showing modest cyclical variation from year to year. The last three 
                                                 
15 It is interesting to note that our ranking of TTWAs is consistent with certain measures of the perfor-
mance of the labour offices. For example, the correlation between our ranking and a ranking that measu-
res the share of unemployed job seekers with a personalised job search plan in labour offices is 
statistically significant (0.3). A closer analysis that relates our efficiency ranking to information on the 
characteristics and performance of labour offices is, however, left for a further study. Lillrank (2005) 
provides an interesting basis for such an analysis. 
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observations, however, indicate an intensifying pattern of divergence: the 
average gross efficiency increases whereas there is a considerable decrease in the 
average net efficiency.  
 
Our results indicate that the gross efficiency improved by about 18 percentage 
points over the investigation period, the average score rising from about 55 to 73 
per cent of the maximum. This corresponds to an annual increase of about 3 per 
cent. The major improvements took place in 1998 and 2003 (see Figure 2). Long-
term unemployment has especially decreased, notably at the end of the research 
period, which has significantly contributed to the gross efficiency.
16 The second 
main determinant of the gross efficiency, the volume of ALMPs, has also 
continuously increased during the period. The increase has not been substantial, 
but due to its large coefficient, about –10, even small changes contribute 
significantly to the efficiency. 
4.5 TTWA heterogeneity 
Figures 3 and 4 describe two interesting cases among the regions. In Kuopio, the 
difference between gross and net efficiency estimates is one of the largest among 
the TTWAs, i.e. the positive contribution of environmental factors is very strong 
(see Figure 3). In particular, the relative proportion of long-term unemployment, 
the volume of the ALMPs and proportion of young unemployed job seekers have 
been favourable (see Appendix 2). From 1997 onwards there has been a marked 
increase in gross efficiency together with a clear decrease in net efficiency. The 
divergence strengthened further at the beginning of the 2000s, due to a notable 
decline in net efficiency. The efficiency related to the performance of the 
matching process deteriorated from about 66 per cent of the maximum in 2000 to 
only about 50 per cent in 2003. At the same time the gross efficiency reached 80 
per cent of the maximum due to the counterbalancing effect of improved 
environmental factors.  
 
The development in Turku has been different (Figure 4). Contrary to Kuopio, the 
gap between the efficiency measures has been very small and the measures move 
in the same direction over the investigation period (except years 2001 and 2002). 
The net efficiency was higher than the gross measure until 2001, when the gross 
measure exceeded it. Hence, the environment also improved in Turku. Similarly 
to the average aggregate-level case, the net efficiency declined at the beginning 
of the 2000s, recovering slightly again in 2003. 
 
It is worth noting that the development of the biggest TTWA in Finland 
(Helsinki, Figure 5) follows quite closely that of Turku. Similarly to Turku, the 
gap between the efficiency measures is small (10 percentage points on average) 
and they move in the same direction over the period. The net efficiency was 
                                                 
16 See Appendix 2 for differences in the control variables over time and across regions. 
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higher than the gross efficiency until 1999. Similarly to the aggregate 
development, the net efficiency declined at the beginning of the 2000s and then 
recovered in 2003. 
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5. Effect of inefficiency and environmental factors on 
aggregate unemployment 
5.1 Inefficiency and aggregate unemployment 
Next we compare the number of matches achieved to the hypothetical number of 
matches that could be achieved if all regions had the highest possible technical 
efficiency. The highest average net technical efficiency is obtained in Turku, 
where the average efficiency score is about 80 per cent of the maximum.
17 
 
The use of net efficiency means that we estimate a hypothetical number of 
hirings in a situation where all TTWAs perform as efficiently as Turku. In order 
to concentrate on the performance of the area in question, we keep constant the 
effect of environmental factors on the matching efficiency. Turku’s matching 
outcome with the net efficiency is on average about 23 percentage points nearer 
the efficiency frontier than that of other areas, whereas the difference in the gross 
measure is about 13 percentage points (see Table 2, columns 3 and 4, on 
average). 
 
To shed light on the quantitative effect of the efficiency differences on hirings, 
we first calculate the estimated number of successful hirings separately in every 
region by using coefficients from specification 4 (Table 2), the mean values of 
vacancies and job seekers in a region, and with the region’s own net technical 
efficiency. In the second phase we replace the values of the net efficiency 
estimates that for Turku, 0.799, and compare the difference in the number of 
hirings between these two cases. The numbers for this exercise are reported in 
columns 3-5 of Table 2. 
 
The results indicate that the percentage increase in hirings would be highest in 
Lahti, about 120 per cent, and lowest in Seinäjoki, 1.5 per cent. On average, the 
hirings would rise by about 36 per cent (see column 3) and the average increase 
in hirings would be about 300 persons per TTWA per month (see column 2). The 
most important change applying to the aggregate labour market would occur in 
the capital region, Helsinki, where hirings would increase by about 2 200 
persons. This accounts for about 36 per cent of the total increase, due to the large 
stocks of job seekers and vacancies in the Helsinki TTWA. This shows how even 
relatively small changes in the matching efficiency in the capital region can 
notably improve the macro-level situation in the Finnish labour market. 
 
                                                 
17 This is calculated as an average over 108 months.   
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Table 3.  Effects according to region 
 
Hirings, Hirings,  Increase in Increase in Share of the
own eff. Turku's eff. hirings hirings (%) total increase (%)
Turku 1 848 1 848 0 0.0 0.0
Seinäjoki 521 529 8 1.5 0.1
Kajaani 419 429 11 2.6 0.2
Kouvola 723 766 43 6.0 0.7
Oulu 1 231 1 344 113 9.2 1.8
Tampere 1 880 2 279 399 21.2 6.5
Joensuu 625 789 164 26.2 2.7
Kuopio 625 817 192 30.8 3.1
Hämeenlinna 450 600 150 33.4 2.4
Kokkola 337 468 131 38.7 2.1
Pori 775 1 091 315 40.7 5.1
Jyväskylä 758 1 167 409 53.9 6.7
Lappeenranta 415 670 255 61.4 4.1
Helsinki 3 425 5 631 2 206 64.4 35.9
Kotka 415 690 275 66.1 4.5
Mikkeli 262 482 219 83.7 3.6
Rovaniemi 302 566 263 87.1 4.3
Vaasa 267 554 287 107.5 4.7
Lahti 590 1 294 705 119.5 11.5
All, on average 893 1 222 329 36.8
Sum, all regions 15 868 22 013 6 145 38.7  
Note: Hirings with a region’s own efficiency have been calculated using estimated coefficients from 
specification 4 in Table 2, average variable values in a region, and the region’s own average net 
efficiency value from Table 4. In hirings with Turku’s efficiency, the efficiency estimate has been 
replaced by Turku’s average efficiency, 0.799. The increase in hirings is the difference between these two 
numbers of hirings. The share of the whole increase is the increase in a region’s hirings as a proportion of 
the total increase. 
 
If all the TTWAs performed as efficiently as Turku, the number of hirings from 
among the unemployed would increase at the aggregate level by about 6 000 per 
month (Table 6, column 3). Remarkably, this would be equivalent to a 39 per 
cent increase. Consequently, the aggregate unemployment rate would drop from 
the current 8.5 per cent level to 6.0 per cent, providing that the new matches 
would yield permanent contracts (6,145 more matches in 12 months would shift 
about 74,000 unemployed to the pool of employed). It is worth emphasising that 
we obtain virtually the same estimate by applying the method of Ilmakunnas and 
Pesola (2003). When equation 1 is evaluated in equilibrium with constant 
unemployment rate, constant returns to scale, and all variables divided by the 
labour force; the efficiency term, -υit, affects the unemployment rate by 1/β1. 
Since β1= 0.782 (from specification 4 in Table 2), the unemployment rate would 
drop from 8.5 to 6.0 per cent. 
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5.2 Environmental factors and aggregate unemployment 
As reported above, environmental factors have been most favourable in Kuopio. 
If all the TTWAs shared the same job seeker characteristics as Kuopio, the 
aggregate unemployment rate would drop to 7.1 per cent. This suggests that the 
elimination of regional differences in environmental factors would not matter as 
much as the equalisation of regional differences in inefficiencies across the 
TTWAs. This does not, however, imply that structural factors affecting matching 
efficiency are unimportant. This can be demonstrated by a simple calculation. 
For example, an elimination of long-term unemployment from the current 
average level of 28 per cent would increase matches by one third. This equals to 
a drop in the unemployment rate from 8.5 to 6.3 per cent. In other words, the 
magnitude of the effect of eliminating long term unemployment would be 
comparable to that of eliminating inefficiency.  
 
It is useful to compare these estimates with those implied by the change in 
matching technology (about 1 per cent per annum) and the change in the average 
gross efficiency (about three per cent per annum). A one per cent increase in 
matches per annum due to better matching technology has lowered the 
unemployment rate by about 0.7 percentage points over the eight year 
examination period. The improvement in gross efficiency from the average score 
of about 55 in 1998 to about 75 in 2003 stems from enhanced structural factors, 
not better net efficiency. Improvements in structural factors over time have 
lowered unemployment by about 1.0 percentage points during the period 1995-
2003. 
 
Finally, the study points out some policy implications which also merit attention. 
According to the results the unemployment rates of the five most efficient 
regions are below the average level, excluding Kajaani, where the unemployment 
rate is the second highest in the data set (see Appendix 1). The results for the 
TTWA of Kajaani suggest that the inefficiency of the matching process is not the 
primary cause for the area’s high unemployment. Consequently, in such a case 
ALMP measures directed to the supply side of the labour market might prove 
rather ineffective. 
 
In the case of inefficient regions, including the capital region of Helsinki, 
difficulties in employing unemployed job seekers cannot be solved only by 
demand stimulus that attracts more inputs, since there are inefficiencies that 
disturb the matching of production. In addition to the low net efficiency in 
matching in Helsinki, the region also suffers from adverse structural factors: over 
32 per cent of unemployment pool consists of long-term unemployed. In 
addition, the volume of ALMPs is the smallest of all regions, being only 3 per 
cent. It is thus not a surprise that the proportion of hirings from among the 
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unemployed is only about 4 per cent in the Helsinki TTWA, while it is about 12 
per cent in the Kajaani TTWA.
18
                                                 
18 Ibourk et al (2004), using French data, reports a negative relationship between the matching efficiency 
of a region and its unemployment rate. Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003), using Finnish data, in turn report a 
positive relationship between these variables. Our finding is closer to the results of Ibourk than those of 
Ilmakunnas and Pesola. In our data the rank correlation coefficient for region’s net efficiency and unem-
ployment rate is –0.21. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper examined the process of matching unemployed job seekers and vacant 
jobs in regional labour markets, taking a stochastic frontier approach. This 
approach proved to be productive when the focus is on the frictions that cause 
delays in the matching process and on differences between regions in their ability 
to produce successful matches. The paper demonstrates that a stochastic frontier 
approach applied to regional level data offers a convenient and interesting 
method to investigate how regional differences in matching efficiency and 
structural factors contribute to aggregate unemployment. 
 
The empirical study provided a number of interesting results. First, average gross 
efficiency improved annually by more than 3 per cent and matching technology 
progressed by about 1 per cent per annum over the investigation period, 
indicating decreasing matching frictions over time. Our estimates indicated that 
improvements in structural factors over time have lowered unemployment by 
about 1.0 percentage points during the period 1995-2003. Improved matching 
technology has, in turn, lowered unemployment by about 0.7 percentage points 
over this period. We assumed that the expanding use of information technology 
has accounted for a part of the improvement in matching technology. 
 
Second, there were notable and temporally stable differences in matching 
efficiency across travel-to-work-areas. If all regions were as efficient as the most 
efficient one, the number of hirings would increase by about 40 per cent. This 
would decrease the aggregate unemployment rate by about 2.5 percentage points, 
from the current 8.5 per cent level to 6.0 per cent. On the other hand, if all the 
areas shared the same job seeker characteristics as the most favourable TTWA, 
the aggregate unemployment rate would drop by 1.4 percentage points. These 
estimates suggested that the elimination of regional differences in structural 
factors would not matter as much as the equalisation of regional differences in 
inefficiencies across the TTWAs. This does not, however, imply that structural 
factors affecting matching efficiency were unimportant. This was demonstrated 
by simple calculations on the effects of structural factors on aggregate 
unemployment. For example, the total elimination of long-term unemployment 
from the current 28 per cent level would increase matches by one third, which 
would yield to a 2.2 percentage point drop in the aggregate unemployment rate. 
The size of this effect is comparable to that caused by the elimination of 
inefficiency. 
 
Third, our results suggested that the matching efficiency in dynamic labour 
markets can be low, such as in the capital region of Helsinki, where the 
unemployment rate is low. Low unemployment in these areas stems from more 
from favourable circumstances related to the aggregate demand rather than the 
efficient operation of the matching process. On the other hand, a high matching 
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efficiency, such as that observed in the TTWA of Kajaani, does not guarantee 
low unemployment.  
 
These findings create challenges for policy makers. When the matching process 
is efficient but the demand is low, further investments in measures decreasing 
frictions, such as supply-based ALMPs, are useless. Inefficiencies in large and 
dynamic regions complicate policy design even further. In low unemployment 
areas, the unemployment status may cause more negative stigma effects than 
elsewhere, resulting in lower employability in such areas than in areas of high 
unemployment. This may generate separated labour markets: those who already 
are employed or come from outside of the labour force can get a new job more 
easily than their unemployed counterparts. In this case, well-designed activation 
measures of ALMP directed to the supply side might work. 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics according to region (average over time) 
 
Mean values
Hirings  Unemployed Vacant Vacant H/U Young Old Long-term  Other job Job seekers  Size of  Unemp.
job seekers jobs, stock jobs, all (%) seekers within ALMP population rate
Turku 2 026 20 760 1 010 2 382 9.8 0.150 0.292 0.289 0.488 0.037 279 332 14.0
Seinäjoki 606 5 184 163 387 11.7 0.149 0.259 0.209 0.724 0.060 58 302 13.9
Kajaani 488 4 086 127 363 11.9 0.169 0.249 0.239 0.570 0.043 60 975 19.9
Kouvola 797 7 577 354 740 10.5 0.142 0.320 0.264 0.512 0.043 99 932 15.8
Oulu 1 343 14 939 534 1 278 9.0 0.181 0.231 0.271 0.502 0.039 183 523 15.9
Tampere 1 909 27 104 1 070 2 449 7.0 0.132 0.300 0.291 0.473 0.041 292 768 16.0
Joensuu 656 8 060 297 683 8.1 0.147 0.243 0.240 0.598 0.051 91 411 19.3
Kuopio 663 8 565 268 676 7.7 0.165 0.241 0.232 0.643 0.056 115 491 16.4
Hämeenlinna 476 5 800 240 567 8.2 0.134 0.332 0.324 0.523 0.041 87 300 14.1
Kokkola 356 4 435 158 374 8.0 0.173 0.286 0.276 0.485 0.049 52 602 16.3
Pori 798 11 808 405 869 6.8 0.131 0.337 0.302 0.540 0.044 116 692 19.0
Jyväskylä 787 13 016 380 880 6.0 0.166 0.270 0.317 0.460 0.040 31 681 18.0
Lappeenranta 431 6 931 189 446 6.2 0.147 0.311 0.292 0.502 0.042 68 826 17.5
Helsinki 3 135 72 866 4 420 9 827 4.3 0.109 0.304 0.325 0.435 0.030 1 159 861 10.8
Kotka 423 6 932 249 537 6.1 0.142 0.319 0.315 0.618 0.040 89 235 16.5
Mikkeli 270 4 579 166 337 5.9 0.134 0.314 0.320 0.584 0.043 70 816 17.6
Rovaniemi 309 5 718 153 379 5.4 0.161 0.225 0.284 0.466 0.040 62 496 21.4
Vaasa 269 4 922 370 815 5.5 0.169 0.310 0.301 0.670 0.039 87 987 11.9
Lahti 567 14 150 553 1 156 4.0 0.131 0.339 0.361 0.453 0.040 167 354 17.3
All, on average 858 13 023 585 1 323 7.5 0.149 0.289 0.287 0.539 0.043 167 189 16.4
Sum, 16 309 247 432 11 106 25 145
all regions  
 
Appendix 2. Development of the inefficiency regressors over time 
 
Young unemployed Old unemployed Long-term unemployed
min average max min average max min average max
1995 0.162 0.183 0.212 0.159 0.203 0.243 0.143 0.297 0.385
1996 0.142 0.166 0.200 0.184 0.235 0.374 0.196 0.302 0.366
1997 0.114 0.147 0.179 0.212 0.269 0.318 0.236 0.306 0.392
1998 0.101 0.141 0.171 0.224 0.289 0.341 0.224 0.304 0.379
1999 0.100 0.145 0.182 0.234 0.301 0.354 0.210 0.283 0.364
2000 0.086 0.141 0.174 0.242 0.315 0.368 0.213 0.279 0.350
2001 0.086 0.138 0.173 0.247 0.325 0.380 0.218 0.283 0.349
2002 0.089 0.139 0.177 0.255 0.326 0.387 0.199 0.270 0.340
2003 0.091 0.141 0.172 0.262 0.337 0.406 0.190 0.258 0.384
Other job seekers Job seekers within ALMP Size of population
min average max min average max min average max
1995 0.301 0.412 0.688 0.025 0.040 0.062 32 563 161 993 1 097 472
1996 0.353 0.464 0.677 0.028 0.043 0.060 32 356 163 395 1 114 214
1997 0.398 0.515 0.748 0.030 0.046 0.067 32 148 164 758 1 131 031
1998 0.430 0.526 0.751 0.030 0.044 0.068 31 901 166 092 1 147 895
1999 0.452 0.544 0.724 0.032 0.043 0.061 31 670 167 361 1 163 845
2000 0.478 0.559 0.755 0.034 0.041 0.055 31 403 168 563 1 178 190
2001 0.469 0.576 0.798 0.030 0.041 0.057 31 174 169 781 1 191 317
2002 0.466 0.607 0.765 0.031 0.044 0.064 31 037 170 936 1 202 761
2003 0.495 0.651 0.845 0.033 0.045 0.067 30 879 171 947 1 212 021  
Note: The minimum and maximum are calculated from yearly averages among regions. 
 
 